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This paper newly introduces three simple geometrical models of oligopsonistic labor 
markets. The first model, which is called the kinked labor supply curve model, is concerned 
with the situation in which oligopsonists act independently without any collusive agreement. 
This model suggests that some oligopsonistic labor markets are likely to exhibit a high 
degree of wage and employment stability. The second model, which is called the joint profit 
maximization model, is concerned with the situation in which all oligopsonists organize a 
body of complete collusion, or a cartel. This model shows that the oligopsonists in the cartel 
will lower the wage rate by collusively reducing their employment and, by doing so, 
maximize the total of their profits. The third model is concerned with the situation 
somewhere between the two above and is called the wage leadership model. This model 
implies that the wage-leading dominant firm will lower the wage rate by substantially 
reducing its own employment by itself in order to maximize its profit. We believe that the 
three models in this paper help us understand the basic workings of oligopsonistic labor 
markets and, therefore, we strongly suggest that the models be put in ordinary textbooks of 
economics. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms are suppliers in a product market. Structures of product markets are usually 
classified into three types, depending mainly upon the number of suppliers, or firms; 
competition (pure or monopolistic), monopoly and oligopoly. For each type of these 
market structures, we can easily find one or a few simple geometrical models in most 
textbooks of microeconomics.   
In a labor market, however, firms are demanders rather than suppliers. Nevertheless, 
structures of labor markets are also analogously classified into three types, depending 
mainly upon the number of demanders, or firms; competition, monopsony and 
oligopsony. In most textbooks of microeconomics, we can also easily find a simple 
 DAEMO KIM  150
geometrical model for each of the competitive and the monopsonistic labor markets. 
However, as for the oligopsonistic labor market, we can hardly find such a model not 
only in textbooks of microeconomics but also in those of labor economics.
1 In order to 
just provide an assortment to labor market models, therefore, we need to introduce some 
simple geometrical models for the oligopsonistic labor market.   
More importantly, there are many labor markets of an oligopsonistic type in the real 
world. An oligopsonistic labor market is characterized typically by fewness of 
demanders. Accordingly, the labor market for professional baseball players in Korea is 
oligopsonistic, since there are only eight teams, or demanders, in the market. So is the 
labor market for professional soccer players. The labor markets for TV talents and 
singers respectively are also oligopsonistic in Korea, since there are only a few major 
TV companies, or demanders. If leading conglomerates, or chaebuls, in Korea organize 
a body of intimate cooperation in a certain domestic labor market, they will surely be 
able to exert dominant power in the market, thus bringing forth another type of 
oligopsonistic structure. As we can hardly find simple geometrical models for these 
oligopsonistic labor markets in ordinary textbooks, however, so can we hardly 
understand the basic workings of these markets. 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce simple geometrical models for 
oligopsonistic labor markets. Because there are only a few firms in an oligopsonistic 
labor market, each firm, or oligopsonist, must consider not only “What should I do?” but 
also “How will the others react to what I do?” In other words, oligopsonists are highly 
interdependent among themselves. Because of such high interdependence, oligopsonists 
usually have strong incentives to get together and cooperate with each other in order to 
avoid costly competition among themselves. Depending upon the degree of cooperation, 
we can develop various kinds of oligopsonistic labor market models. In fact, we can 
build as many models as those we can find for oligopolistic product markets. 
In this paper, however, we are going to build only three such models, all of which 
are exactly the counterparts of those for oligopolistic product markets. Specifically, the 
first model, which will be called the kinked labor supply curve model, is concerned with 
the situation in which there is no cooperative agreement at all and each oligopsonist acts 
independently. The second model, which will be called the joint profit maximization 
model, is concerned with the situation in which all oligopsonists in the labor market 
organize a body of complete cooperation, or a cartel. The third, and the last, model is 
concerned with the situation somewhere between the two above and will be called the 
 
1 We cannot even find the word ‘oligopsony’ in Reynolds et al. (1991) nor in Ehrenberg and Smith(1997), both 
of which are well-known textbooks of labor economics. Ferguson(1969, p.40) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld(1998, p.358) 
introduce only the definition of oligopsony. Rarely, Henderson and Quandt(1971, pp.242-243) give some 
explanations about oligopsony: They mention that “most theories of duopoly and oligopoly···can be modified 
to cover duopsony and oligopsony” and introduce, though mathematically rather than geometrically, a 
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wage leadership model. In order to set up the yardstick by which to evaluate the 
workings of these models, we are going to examine the workings of a competitive labor 
market in the first place.   
 
 
2.  COMPETITIVE  LABOR  MARKET 
 
There are so many firms, or demanders, in a competitive labor market that no single firm 
can influence the wage rate. In other words, the wage rate is determined in the market and 
each of the individual firms can do nothing but take the market-determined wage rate as it is. 
The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Competitive  Labor  Market 
 
 
The market is depicted in panel (a). The equilibrium wage rate and level of 
employment are determined respectively at W  and   by the intersection of the 
market supply    curve and the market demand    curve. With the wage rate 
given at  , an individual firm just takes the wage rate as it is. But the firm can hire as 
many workers as it needs at this wage rate, which is shown by the horizontal labor 
supply   curve in panel (b). Since the   curve is horizontal, it also becomes the 
firm’s marginal cost of labor    curve. The firm’s profit-maximizing employment 
is then determined at    by the intersection of its marginal revenue product of labor 
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For a moment, we are going to make a little digression and introduce the definition 
of wage exploitation in order to help better understand our later discussions. According 
to Joan Robinson’s definition,
2  a worker is exploited if he or she is employed at a wage 
rate which is less than the value of marginal product of labor ( .   is 
defined as the marginal product of labor   multiplied by the price of the product 
(P), whereas   is equal to   multiplied by the marginal revenue of the 
product  . If the product market is competitive, P is equal to 
) L VMP L VMP
) ( L MP
L MRP
) (MR MR and, hence, 
 is equal to  . On the other hand, if the product market is non-competitive, 
P is higher than 
L VMP L MRP
MR and,  hence, VMP   is higher than  .   L MRP
We have noted above that   is equal to   in the competitive labor market. 
If the product market is also competitive, then    must also be equal to  . There 
occurs no wage exploitation at all. This result brings forth the following proposition: 
0 W L MRP
0 W L VMP
 
If there occurs wage exploitation   even though the product market is 
competitive  , then the exploitation stems from the labor market in 
which  . That is,  . 
) L VMP W <
L L VMP =
) ( L L MRP VMP =
L MRP W W <
 
By the same token, the following proposition also holds: 
 
If there occurs wage exploitation   even though the labor market is 
competitive  , then the exploitation stems from the product market in 
which  . That is,  . 
) ( L VMP W <
L VMP MRP <
) ( L MRP W =
L L MRP > VMP L
 
Returning from the digression, suppose now that there is a market-level labor union 
and that the union demands a wage increase to the level of   so strongly that the 
firms cannot reject the demand. Employment will fall to    in the market and to   
at the firm. The union can increase the wage rate, but it can do so only by decreasing the 
level of employment.   
U W
MU L U L
 
 
3.    KINKED LABOR SUPPLY CURVE MODEL   
 
Suppose there is an oligopsonistic labor market which consists of a few firms of 
more or less equal size. Suppose further that there is no cooperative agreement and each 
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oligopsonist acts independently. When contemplating a change in the wage rate either up 
or down, therefore, it must consider how its rivals will react. The situation is shown in 
Figure 2, in which the oligopsonist is presently at  A: The wage rate is   and the 
level of employment is  . There are two labor supply curves passing through 
0 W
0 L A; the 
relatively more elastic   curve and the less elastic   curve. The   and the 
 curves represent the marginal cost of labor curves corresponding respectively to 
the   and  the   curves. 
L S ' SL L MC
' MCL
L S ' SL
Suppose specifically that each oligopsonist visualizes the labor supply curve to its 
firm by reasoning in the following way: 
 
If I raise my wage rate above  , my rivals will also raise their wage rates in order 
not to lose their workers. Therefore, the labor supply to my firm will rise relatively 
less following the less elastic   curve. On the other hand, if I cut my wage rate 
below  , my rivals probably won’t cut their wage rates and I’ll lose my workers 
to them. Therefore, the labor supply to my firm will fall relatively more along the 












































Figure 2.    Kinked Labor Supply Curve Model   
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That is to say, the labor supply curve the oligopsonist visualizes is  , which 
has the kink at 
' S A S L L − −
A. Corresponding to this kinked labor supply curve is the marginal cost 
of labor curve  . Note this curve has the discontinuous part between 
 and C . 
' MC C B L L − − − MC
B
If the oligopsonist’s marginal revenue product of labor   curve is presently 
located at  , then its profit-maximizing employment is determined at   b y 
the intersection of the discontinuous   curve and the   
curve. At this level of employment, the oligopsonist’s wage rate is determined by the 
kinked labor supply curve at  . That is, 
) ( L MRP
' L
0 L MRP 0 L
MRP MC C B MCL − − − 0 L
0 W A  is the equilibrium point. 
Suppose now that, for some reason or other, the   curve fluctuates between 
 and    as illustrated by the   and  the   curves.  The 
 curve intersects both the   and the   curves again 
at  . The oligopsonist’s profit-maximizing employment and wage rate are determined 
again at   and W  respectively. The equilibrium point does not change at all. The 
kinked labor supply curve model thus implies that some oligopsonistic labor markets are 
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Notice that, at the equilibrium level of employment  , the wage rate   is  lower 
than  . If the   curve is presently the effective one, for example, the 
difference is as large as the distance between 
0 L 0 W
L MRP 2 L MRP
A  and  . There occurs wage 
exploitation in this oligopsonistic labor market even if there is no cooperative agreement 
and each oligopsonist acts independently. 
C
Finally, suppose that there is a strong labor union and that the union demands a wage 
increase to the level of  . Then, the effective labor supply curve is now   
and its corresponding marginal cost of labor curve is W . If the 
 curve is presently the effective one, for example, the profit-maximizing 
employment is determined at    by the intersection of the   curve 
and the   curve. Note that both W  and   are higher than W  and   
respectively. In this type of oligopsonistic labor market, the labor union can increase not 
only the wage rate but also the level of employment if the union demands an appropriate 
amount of wage increase. Notice also that, even though the   curve fluctuates 
between 
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D  and  , the level of employment is still determined at  . The kinked 
labor supply curve model still implies that, even if there is a labor union, some 
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4.    JOINT PROFIT MAXIMIZATION MODEL 
 
Suppose again that there are a few firms o f  m o r e  o r  l e s s  e q u a l  s i z e  i n  a n  
oligopsonistic labor market. But, contrary to the situation above, suppose these 
oligopsonists have agreed with each other that they organize a body of complete 
cooperation, or a cartel, so that they may maximize the total of their profits. If so, the 
situation is much the same as the one in which there is a monopsonist who has a few 
plants hiring the same kind of workers. Figure 3 shows the situation. 
Each oligopsonist has its own marginal revenue product of labor   curve 
(not shown). To sum up all of the oligopsonists’   curves horizontally gives the 
 curve. The   curve represents the total labor supply to the market and the 
  curve represents the marginal cost of labor curve corresponding to the   curve. 
The total- profit-maximizing employment is determined at    by the intersection of the 
 curve and the Σ  curve. With this level of employment  , the wage rate 
is then determined by the   curve  at W . That is, the equilibrium point is 
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Figure 3.  Joint Profit Maximization Model 
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Notice again that, at the equilibrium level of employment  , the wage rate   is 
lower than   by the amount AB. There occurs this amount of wage exploitation 
in this oligopsonistic labor market.   
0 L 0 W
L MRP Σ
If the labor market were competitive rather than oligopsonistic, each oligopsonist’s 
 curve (not shown) would be its labor demand curve and, therefore, the   
curve, which is derived by horizontally summing up all of the oligopsonists’   
curves, would be the total labor demand curve   in the market. Therefore, the 
equilibrium point would be   at which the   curve intersects the   curve. The 
level of employment and the wage rate would be determined at   and   
respectively. Note that both the level of employment and the wage rate at the 
oligopsonistic equilibrium (  and  ) are lower than those at the competitive 
equilibrium (W  and  ). That is, the oligopsonists in the cartel lower the wage rate 
by collusively reducing their employment and, by so doing, maximize the total of their 
profits. 
L MRP L MRP Σ
L MRP
C W
) ( LC D
C
W




Suppose now that there is a strong market-level labor union and that the union 
demands a wage increase to the level of  . Then, the effective labor supply curve is 
 and its corresponding marginal cost of labor curve is  . 
The profit-maximizing employment is determined at   by the intersection of the 
 curve and the   curve. The equilibrium point is  , which 
is also the competitive equilibrium point as noted above. In short, the union can push the 
cartelized oligopsonists to the point of competitive equilibrium if it demands an 
appropriate amount of wage increase. 
C W
L
L C S C W − −
C D C W − − −
L C MC D C W − − −
C
C L
L MC MRP Σ
 
 
5.  WAGE  LEADERSHIP  MODEL 
 
Suppose this time that there are one dominant firm (or a cartel of a few leading 
firms) and many small firms in an oligopsonistic labor market. Suppose further these 
firms have agreed with each other, explicitly or implicitly, that the dominant firm first 
determines the wage rate and then the small firms just take the wage rate so determined. 
In other words, the dominant firm is the wage leader and the small firms are just wage 
takers, or followers. Under this agreement, the small firms are much the same as those in 
a competitive labor market in the sense that the labor supply curve to each of these firms 
is horizontal at the wage rate determined by the dominant firm and, hence, that the 
  curve of each of the small firms represents its labor demand curve. The situation 











































Figure 4.  Wage  Leadership  Model 
 
 
LS MRP Σ  is derived by summing up horizontally all of the small firms’   
curves (not shown) and, therefore, represents the total labor demand curve of the small 
firms.
L MRP
3 The    curve represents the total labor supply to the market.  LT S
The   curve, which is derived by horizontally subtracting the   curve 











 curve represents the marginal cost of labor corresponding to the   
curve. The   curve represents the dominant firm’s marginal revenue product of 
labor. Under the setting like this, the dominant firm’s profit-maximizing employment is 
determined at    by the intersection of the    curve and the   curve.  At 
this level of employment, the wage rate is determined by the   curve  at W . With 





3 A change in wages, by changing employment and output, will also change the price of the product, 
which will then shift each firm’s   curve. When deriving the total labor demand curve of the small 
firms, we must take this price effect into account. In this paper, however, we ignore such an effect for 
simplification. 
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the same as those in a competitive market, is determined by the   curve at 
. Therefore, the total employment of both the dominant and the small firms is 
determined at  , which is equal to   plus  . In short, the equilibrium wage 
rate and level of employment are   and    respectively in this oligopsonistic labor 
market. 
LS MRP Σ
0 S L Σ
0 T L
MRP
0 D L 0 S L Σ
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Note that, at the level of the dominant firm’s employment  , the wage rate   
is lower than   by the amount 
0 D L 0 W
LD . There occurs this amount of wage 
exploitation. Note also that, at the level of small firms’ total employment  , the 
wage rate   is equal to  . There occurs no wage exploitation. That is, in this 
particular type of labor market, there occurs some wage exploitation at the wage-leading 
dominant firm and no exploitation at the small firms. 
0 S L Σ
0 W MRP Σ
If the labor market were competitive, the    curve would also be the dominant 
firm’s labor demand curve  . Therefore, the   curve, which is derived by 
summing up horizontally the   curve and Σ  curve, would represent the total 
labor demand in the market. Therefore, the equilibrium point would be determined at   













 curve. The wage rate and the level of 
total employment in the market would be   and   respectively. As for individual 
firms, the level of the dominant firm’s employment would be   and that of small 
firms’ employment would be  . As expected, both the wage rate and the level of 
total employment at the oligopsonistic equilibrium (W  and  ) are lower than those 
at the competitive equilibrium (W  and  ). As for individual firms, also as expected, 
the level of the dominant firm’s employment at the oligopsonistic equilibrium   is 
lower than that at the competitive equilibrium  . Note, however, that the level of 
small firms’ employment is higher at the oligopsonistic equilibrium   than  at  the 
competitive equilibrium  . In sum, the wage-leading dominant firm lowers the 




) ( 0 D L
Suppose now that there is a strong labor union at the dominant firm (or in the 
market) and that the union demands a wage increase to the level of W . Then, the 
effective labor supply curve to the dominant firm is   and the marginal 
cost of labor curve corresponding to this supply curve is WC . The 
firm’s profit-maximizing employment is now determined at    by the intersection of 
the   curve and the   curve. As for the small firms, with the 
wage rate at  , their total employment is determined by the   curve  at Σ . 
Therefore, the total employment of both the dominant and the small firms is determined 
at  , which is equal to the sum of   and  . The equilibrium point is  , 
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which is also the competitive equilibrium point as noted above. Once again, the union 
can push not only the wage-leading dominant firm but the whole labor market to the 
point of competitive equilibrium if it demands an appropriate amount of wage increase. 
 
 
6.    SOME REAL WORLD CASES   
 
We believe the three simple geometrical models of this paper help us understand the 
basic workings of some oligopsonistic labor markets. In order to make the models 
theoretically complete, however, we need to do some empirical studies for each of them. 
This must obviously be a very difficult job and, therefore, we are going to refrain from 
doing such a job in this paper. But we can think over many real-world cases to which the 
models can possibly apply. We are going to conclude this paper by presenting two of 
such cases in Korea. 
 
Labor Market for Baseball Players 
 
The first case is the labor market for professional baseball players. There are only 
eight teams, or demanders, in the market and these teams have an organization of strong 
cooperation, namely the Korea Baseball Organization (KBO). Above all, the KBO rules 
severely restrict mobility of players between teams. Specifically, there are two typical 
systems by which the KBO and its member teams restrict the mobility. One is the 
system of reservation and the other is the system of nomination. 
Under the reservation system, each team reserves the right to keep on holding its 
existing players up to the maximum number of sixty. That is, every year, each team 
submits to the KBO president the list of its players whom it wants to keep on holding 
and the president collects and publicly announces all of the lists submitted by its 
member teams. A player, once so reserved by a team, cannot virtually make a contract 
with any other team. Similarly, under the nomination system, each team is authorized to 
preferentially nominate certain rookie players according to a predetermined procedure. 
A rookie player, once so nominated by a team, cannot make a contract with any other 
team without the consent of the nominating team. In addition, each team can not only 
transfer a player to other teams but also waive its contract with a player. 
There is virtually no counterbalancing system on the part of players, or suppliers, 
however. The situation is therefore very close to the setting of the joint profit 
maximization model without a labor union. The labor market for professional baseball 
players in Korea is thus very likely to be characterized by point  A  in Figure 3. 
From the early 2000 on, there has been a movement among active baseball players to 
organize a labor union. The KBO and its member teams responded immediately with 
strong opposition. In the spring of 2001, however, the players succeeded in formally 
organizing a body, namely the Conference of Baseball Players. This Conference, even 
though it is not a labor union officially, has been playing a union-like role to improve DAEMO KIM  160
employment conditions of the players. Activities of the Conference may therefore be 
considered as efforts to move, in Figure 3, from point  A to  point C . 
 
Attempt of Conglomerates to Form a Wage Cartel 
 
In the later half of the 1970s, there was severe competition among conglomerates, or 
chaebuls, in Korea to attract new college graduates. As a result, while the general wage 
level rose rapidly, the wage level of college graduates rose even more rapidly. During 
the three-year period from 1976 to 1979, the general wage level doubled and, in 1978 for 
instance, the average wage rate of college graduates was 2.3 times as high as that of high 
school graduates. In the spring of 1980, therefore, executive officers of the leading 
general trading corporations, which respectively were representative companies of the 
chaebuls they belonged to, had a meeting and made an agreement that the wage increase 
of new college graduates should be restricted within 10%. 
Severe criticism immediately followed from mass communication and the public 
opinion, saying that the chaebuls, which had already been exercising dominant powers 
in major product markets, were then trying to command labor markets as well by 
forming a wage cartel. In a few days, the executive officers of the general trading 
corporations had a meeting again and officially announced that they would withdraw the 
previous agreement to restrict the wage increase of new college graduates. The event 
calmed down officially as a result. 
Although the chaebuls officially withdrew the agreement to form an explicit wage 
cartel in 1980, there always exists the possibility that they make some kind of tacit 
agreement in the labor market. If they do, they are very likely to exercise dominant 
powers in some labor markets. In fact, the 1980 event indicates that the chaebuls 
themselves have manifested the truth of this likelihood. 
The situation is then very close to the setting of the wage leadership model: There 
are one dominant firm (or a cartel of chaebuls) and many small firms in the labor market. 
The wage rate and the level of total employment thus are very likely to be determined 
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